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proxmark3/traces/README.md
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iceman1001andClaude Opus 5 e648438306 hf 14b view: decode MyKey / COGES keys on SRIX4K
The SRIX4K block scrambler in cmdhf14b.c was a three entry lookup table with
its callers commented out, so `hf 14b valid` printed hard coded values and
nothing ever decoded. The scrambler is a 4x4 transpose of the block read as
sixteen crumbs. A transpose is its own inverse and it reproduces all three
entries of the old table, so the stub is replaced by a working parser.

client/src/parsers/parsemykey.c reads the application off a dump: key id,
production date, operations counter, vendor code, lock id, current and
previous credit, and the eight slot transaction ring. Every block carries a
checksum in its top byte and the parser reports how many hold up, which
catches a wrong UID or a torn write. The credit blocks are XORed with a
session key derived from the UID, the vendor code and the count down counter
in block 6, so the file name has to carry the UID.

`hf 14b valid` is removed. Checking that the maths holds is now
`hf 14b view --selftest`, following `hf mf view --selftest`, and it runs
against traces/hf-14b-D0021F673CB26556-dump.json, a dump of a real reset key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 10:58:57 +02:00

210 lines
12 KiB
Markdown

# Introduction
* `.pm3` are analog signal files to be loaded with `data load` and displayed with `data plot`
* `.trace` are protocol binary data to be loaded with `trace load` and displayed with `trace list <protocol> 1`
# Analog acquisitions
## LF traces
|filename |description|
|-----------------------------------------|-----------|
|lf_AWID-15-259.pm3 |AWID FSK RF/50 FC: 15 Card: 259 |
|lf_Casi-12ed825c29.pm3 |casi rusco 40 bit (EM410x ID: 12ed825c29)|
|lf_EM4102-1.pm3 |credit card style card EM4102 tag (ID: 010872e77c)|
|lf_EM4102-2.pm3 |credit card style card EM4102 tag (ID: 010872beec)|
|lf_EM4102-3.pm3 |credit card style card EM4102 tag (ID: 010872e14f)|
|lf_EM4102-clamshell.pm3 |Samy's clamshell EM4102 tag (ID: 1f00d9b3a5)|
|lf_EM4102-fob.pm3 |(ID: 0400193cbe)|
|lf_EM4102-thin.pm3 |Samy's thin credit-card style EM4102 tag (ID: 1a0041375d)|
|lf_EM4x05.pm3 |ear tag FDX-B ISO-11784/5 (ID: 6DB0840800F80001 - Application Identifier: 8000, Country Code: 124 (Canada), National ID: 270601654)|
|lf_EM4x50.pm3 |credit card style card EM4x50 tag (ID: DE2A3F00)|
|lf_FDX_Bio-Thermo.pm3 |FDX Animal tag with Biosensor|
|lf_GALLAGHER.pm3 |GALLAGHER tag|
|lf_GProx_36_30_14489.pm3 |G-Prox-II FC: 30 Card: 3949, Format 36b ASK/BIPHASE|
|lf_HID-proxCardII-05512-11432784-1.pm3 |clamshell-style HID ProxCard II card|
|lf_HID-weak-fob-11647.pm3 |HID 32bit Prox Card#: 11647. very weak tag/read but just readable.|
|lf_HomeAgain.pm3 |HomeAgain animal (cat) tag - ID 985121004515220|
|lf_HomeAgain1600.pm3 |HomeAgain animal (cat) tag - ID 985121004515220|
|lf_IDTECK_4944544BAC40E069.pm3 |IDTECK raw 4944544BAC40E069 , PSK, printed "806 082 43084"|
|lf_IDTECK_4944544B351FBE4B.pm3 |IDTECK raw 4944544B351FBE4B , PSK, printed "708 082 14087"|
|lf_IDTECK_idk50_PSK.pm3 |IDTECK (?)|
|lf_Indala-00002-12345678-1A.pm3 |Indala credit-card style card|
|lf_indala_4041x_234_21801.pm3 |Indala 4041X 26-bit|
|lf_Indala-504278295.pm3 |PSK 26 bit indala|
|lf_IOProx-XSF-01-3B-44725.pm3 |IO Prox FSK RF/64 ID in name|
|lf_IOProx-XSF-01-BE-03011.pm3 |IO Prox FSK RF/64 ID in name|
|lf_Keri.pm3 |Keri PSK-3 Key Ring tag (back of tag: 1460 3411)|
|lf_Motorola_0437_00072.pm3 |Motorola Grey clamshell card, old. (RAW: A0000000E308C0C1)|
|lf_NEXWATCH_Nexkey_74755342.pm3 |NEXWATCH, Nexkey ID: 74755342|
|lf_NEXWATCH_Quadrakey-521512301.pm3 |NEXWATCH, Quadrakey ID: 521512301|
|lf_NEXWATCH_Securakey-64169.pm3 |Securakey Tag BitLen: 26, Card ID: 64169, FC: 0x35|
|lf_PAC-8E4C058E.pm3 |PAC/Stanley 20204/21020 PAC8 tag (ID: 8E4C058E)|
|lf_Paradox-96_40426-APJN08.pm3 |PARADOX FC 96 CN 40426|
|lf_TI.pm3 |TI HDX FSK 134.2 / 123.2kHz, zerocross line acquisition at 2 MHz|
|lf_Transit999-best.pm3 |Transit 999 format (UID 99531670)|
|lf_VeriChip_1022000000084146.pm3 |VeriChip, epoxy encased glasschip (ID: 1022-00000000084146) |
|lf_VISA2000.pm3 |VISA2000 ASK/MAN RF/64, Card: 480518|
## LF test traces
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|lf_Q5_mod-* |Q5 configured to emit `00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B` under various modulation schemes|
|lf_ATA5577_* |ATA5577 configured to emulate various techs as suggested in the Proxmark3 clone commands|
|lf_ATA5577.txt |Description on how lf_ATA5577_* were generated|
## LF sniffed traces
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|lf_sniff_blue_cloner_em4100.pm3 |Sniffing of blue cloner writing an EM4100 on T5577 and EM4305|
|lf_sniff_ht2-BC3B8810-acg-reader.pm3 |Sniffing of Hitag2 being read by an HID ACG LF Multitag reader|
|lf_sniff_ht2-BC3B8810-frosch-reader.pm3 |Sniffing of Hitag2 being read by a Frosch Hitag reader|
|lf_sniff_ht2-BC3B8810-rfidler-reader.pm3 |Sniffing of Hitag2 being read by a RFIDler|
|lf_ht2_pwd_sniff.trace |Sniffing of a genuine Hitag2 in password mode being read by a Paxton reader|
|lf_ht2_crypto_sniff.trace |Sniffing of a Hitag2 in crypto mode, showing the NrAr exchange|
|lf_ht2_pwd_sim.trace |`lf hitag sim` answering a Paxton reader in password mode, recorded by the simulating Proxmark|
## HF traces
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|hf_14b_raw_050008_resp.pm3 |Response of 14b card to `hf 14b raw -c 050008`|
|hf_14b_raw_0600_st_sri512.pm3 |Response of ST SRI512 to `hf 14b raw -c 0600`|
|hf_14b_raw_0600_st_sri512_collision.pm3 |Same but with two cards, showing the collisions in answers|
|hf_14b_raw_10_ask_ctx.pm3 |Response of ASK CTx to `hf 14b raw -c 10`|
|hf_14b_raw_010fxxxxxxxx_innovatron.pm3 |Response of 14b' card to `hf 14b raw -c -k 010fxxxxxxxx`|
## HF sniffed traces
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|hf_sniff_14b_scl3711.pm3 |`hf sniff 15000 2` <> `nfc-list -t 8`: PUPI: c12c8b1b AppData: 00000000 ProtInfo: 917171|
# Demodulated acquisitions
## HF demodulated traces
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|hf_14a_reader_4b.trace |Execution of `hf 14a reader` against a 4b UID card|
|hf_14a_reader_4b_rats.trace |Execution of `hf 14a reader` against a 4b UID card with RATS|
|hf_14a_reader_7b_rats.trace |Execution of `hf 14a reader` against a 7b UID card with RATS|
|hf_14a_mfu.trace |Reading of a password-protected MFU|
|hf_14a_mfuc.trace |Reading of a UL-C with 3DES authentication|
|hf_14a_mfu-sim.trace |Trace seen from a Proxmark3 simulating a MFU|
|hf_14b_reader.trace |Execution of `hf 14b reader` against a card|
|hf_14b_cryptorf_select.trace |Sniff of libnfc select / anticollision ofa cryptoRF tag|
|hf_14b_xerox_info.trace |Execution of `hf xerox info` against a tag|
|hf_15_reader.trace |Execution of `hf 15 reader` against a card|
|hf_mfp_mad_sl3.trace |`hf mfp mad`|
|hf_mfp_read_sc0_sl3.trace |`hf mfp rdsc --sn 0 -k ...`|
|hf_visa_apple_ecp.trace |Sniff of VISA Apple ECP transaction|
|hf_visa_apple_normal.trace |Sniff of VISA Apple normal transaction|
|hf_visa_apple_transit_bypass.trace |Sniff of VISA Apple transaction bypass|
|hf_mfdes_sniff.trace |Sniff of HID reader reading a MIFARE DESFire SIO card|
|hf_iclass_sniff.trace |Sniff of HID reader reading a Picopass 2k card|
|hf_mf_hid_sio_sim.trace |Simulation of a HID SIO MFC 1K card|
|hf_14a_mful_aes_defaultkey.trace |Reading of a UL-AES with AES authentication|
|hf_14a_mful_aes_defaultkey_secure_message.trace|Reading of a UL-AES with AES authentication, GetVersion with secure message|
## LF demodulated traces
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|lf_hitag_crypto_dump.trace |Execution of `lf hitag dump --crypto` against Hitag2 card in crypto mode|
## LF emulator dumps
Tag images for `lf hitag eload`, used to simulate a Hitag 2 in each of its
operating modes. Byte 0 of page 3 is the configuration byte that selects the
mode, so the files differ mainly in that one byte.
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|lf-hitag-CE129911-dump.bin |Hitag2 in password mode (config `0x06`), password `BDF5E846`|
|lf_ht2_crypto.bin |Hitag2 in crypto mode (config `0x0E`), key `4F4EBDF5E846`|
|lf_ht2_crypto_1CAEFD13.bin |Hitag2 in crypto mode (config `0x0E`)|
|lf_ht2_publicA.bin |Hitag2 in Public Mode A (config `0x02`), Manchester, pages 4-5, carries an EM4102 payload|
|lf_ht2_publicB.bin |Hitag2 in Public Mode B (config `0x00`), biphase 32 T0, pages 4-7|
|lf_ht2_publicC.bin |Hitag2 in Public Mode C (config `0x04`), biphase 64 T0, pages 4-7|
## MIFARE DESFire card images
Card images for `hf mfdes eload`, used by `hf mfdes sim`. All three are in the
`mfdes v1` dump format documented in `doc/mfdes_dump_format.md`.
The 8K images come off a genuine MIFARE DESFire EV1 8K, UID `04268512A25680`,
batch `B9 0C 17 49 70`, week 27 / 2017, hardware `04010101001A05`, software
`04010101041A05`.
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|hf-mfdes-ev1-8k-empty.json |EV1 8K straight after `formatpicc`. PICC only, default 2TDEA key, 7936 bytes free|
|hf-mfdes-ev1-4k-empty.json |The same image edited to present as an EV1 4K. **Derived, not dumped from 4K silicon** -- the storage size byte of `VersionHW`/`VersionSW` is changed from `0x1A` to `0x18`, and `FreeMem` set to 3840, the nominal 4096 minus the 256 bytes of overhead the 8K part shows|
|hf-mfdes-ev1-8k-test.json |The same card with three applications and all five EV1 file types, for exercising a simulation|
|hf-mfdes-ev1-8k-test-keys.json |Application keys for the above, in the `mfdes v2` format `hf mfdes chk -j` writes|
|hf-mfdes-ev1-8k-empty-keys.json|Key file for the empty 8K image. Empty by construction, a blank card has no applications|
|hf-mfdes-ev1-4k-empty-keys.json|Key file for the empty 4K image. Likewise empty|
### Keys
Every key on this card is the counting sequence `01 02 03 .. 10`, extended to
`.. 18` for the 24 byte 3TDEA keys. The PICC master key is 2TDEA
`0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F10`; each application uses its own algorithm,
and all of its keys are that algorithm's length of the same sequence.
Deliberately not the all-zero key, and not a key whose two halves match. A
16 byte DES/2TDEA key string whose second half equals the first is handled as a
single DES key by the PICC -- during authentication *and* session key
generation (M134034 8.1) -- and the all-zero key is the common case of that. A
card image keyed with it exercises only the degenerate path: an implementation
that derives the wrong session key still authenticates, and only fails later on
the first MACed or enciphered frame. This sequence has distinct halves, so a
wrong derivation shows up immediately.
The `mfdes v2` key files carry **application** keys only -- that format has no
place for the PICC master key, because `hf mfdes chk` only walks the application
list and takes the PICC key from `-k`. Hand it in explicitly:
```
hf mfdes dump -n 0 -t 2TDEA -k 0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F10 --keys traces/mifare/hf-mfdes-ev1-8k-test-keys.json
```
Note that every key is also stored inside the dump itself, under each
application's `Keys` object, so `eload` and `sim` need no key file at all --
the key files are for reading or rebuilding the physical card.
`hf-mfdes-ev1-8k-test.json` holds:
|AID|keys|ISO DF name|files|
|---|----|-----------|-----|
|`010203`|AES, 3 |`test1`|`01` standard 256 B free access, `02` backup 128 B MAC mode, rights `1200`|
|`112233`|2TDEA, 2 |`test2`|`00` value, 1000 with limits [0..10000], `01` linear record, 2 of 8 records, 16 B each|
|`AABBCC`|3TDEA, 5 |`test3`|`05` cyclic record, 1 of 4 records, 24 B each, `03` standard 64 B free access|
```
hf mfdes eload -f traces/mifare/hf-mfdes-ev1-8k-test.json
hf mfdes sim
```
## ST25TB card images
`14b v2` dump format, 128 EEPROM blocks of four bytes followed by the system
block. The file name has to carry the UID, `hf 14b view` reads it from there to
work out the chip type and, for MyKey, to derive the session key.
|filename|description|
|--------|-----------|
|hf-14b-D0021F673CB26556-dump.json |ST25TB04K carrying a COGES v3 MyKey, reset state: no vendor bound, zero credit, empty transaction ring. Blocks 7 and 8 are write protected|
```
hf 14b view -f traces/hf-14b-D0021F673CB26556-dump.json
```
This is the vector behind `hf 14b view --selftest`, which checks the block
scrambler, the session key and all 48 block checksums against it.