Clean up of redundent code in TLS and Basic auth

This commit is contained in:
QuantumEntangledAndy committed 2020-07-11 09:11:11 +07:00
1 parent ad1b34239c
commit 4723435a45
1 file changed
+38 -38
+38 -38
View File
@@ -49,21 +49,8 @@ impl RtspServer {
let factory = RTSPMediaFactory::new();
for permitted_user in permitted_users {
debug!("Permitting {} to access {}", permitted_user, paths.join(", "));
self.add_watcher_role(&factory, &permitted_user)
}
// During auth, first it binds anonymously. At this point it checks
// RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS to see if anyone can connect
// This is done before the auth token is loaded, possibliy an upstream bug there
// After checking RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS anonymously
// It loads the auth token of the user and checks that users
// RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_CONSTRUCT allowing them to play
// As a result of this we must ensure that if anonymous is not granted watcher
// access that anon has at least RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS
if ! permitted_users.contains(&"anonymous".to_string()) {
self.add_check_role(&factory, "anonymous");
}
debug!("Permitting {} to access {}", permitted_users.join(", "), paths.join(", "));
self.add_permitted_roles(&factory, permitted_users);
//factory.set_protocols(RTSPLowerTrans::TCP);
factory.set_launch(&format!("{}{}{}{}",
@@ -104,27 +91,42 @@ impl RtspServer {
Ok(maybe_app_src)
}
pub fn add_watcher_role(&self, factory: &RTSPMediaFactory, role: &str) {
factory.add_role_from_structure(
&Structure::new(
&role,
&[
(*RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS, &true),
(*RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_CONSTRUCT, &true),
]
)
);
}
pub fn add_check_role(&self, factory: &RTSPMediaFactory, role: &str) {
factory.add_role_from_structure(
&Structure::new(
&role,
&[
(*RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS, &true),
]
)
);
pub fn add_permitted_roles(&self, factory: &RTSPMediaFactory, permitted_roles: &Vec<String>) {
for permitted_role in permitted_roles {
factory.add_role_from_structure(
&Structure::new(
permitted_role.as_str(),
&[
(*RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS, &true),
(*RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_CONSTRUCT, &true),
]
)
);
}
// During auth, first it binds anonymously. At this point it checks
// RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS to see if anyone can connect
// This is done before the auth token is loaded, possibliy an upstream bug there
// After checking RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS anonymously
// It loads the auth token of the user and checks that users
// RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_CONSTRUCT allowing them to play
// As a result of this we must ensure that if anonymous is not granted RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS
// As a part of permitted users then we must allow it to access
// at least RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS but not RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_CONSTRUCT
// Watching Actually happens during RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_CONSTRUCT
// So this should be OK to do.
// FYI: If no RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS then server returns 404 not found
// If yes RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS but no RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_CONSTRUCT
// server returns 401 not authourised
if ! permitted_roles.contains(&"anonymous".to_string()) {
factory.add_role_from_structure(
&Structure::new(
"anonymous",
&[
(*RTSP_PERM_MEDIA_FACTORY_ACCESS, &true),
]
)
);
}
}
pub fn set_credentials(&self, credentials: &Vec<Option<(&str, &str)>>) -> Result<()> {
@@ -157,8 +159,6 @@ impl RtspServer {
let cert = TlsCertificate::new_from_pem(&cert_contents).expect("Not a valid TLS certificate");
auth.set_tls_certificate(Some(&cert));
auth.set_tls_authentication_mode(client_auth);
// We set to none here, when set up credentials is called it will change it to the appropiate value
auth.set_supported_methods(RTSPAuthMethod::None);
self.server.set_auth(Some(&auth));
Ok(())